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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER UNITED STATES
CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE
ARMED FORCES ABROAD
Under Reid v. Covert1 and subsequent cases,2 United States
civilians accompanying the armed forces to United States military
bases on foreign soil cannot be tried by court-martial3 for criminal
offenses. If a United States civilian is to be tried by United States
authorities during peacetime, 4 he must receive the full benefit of con-
stitutional guarantees regardless of the trial's locus.
In effect, these decisions deprive the United States of jurisdiction
to try offenses committed by its civilians accompanying the armed forces
abroad. Consequently, if the host country fails to prosecute the of-
fenders, there will be no forum in which to bring suit. Except for a
limited number of offenses,5 these cases cannot be tried by United
States courts because Congress has made no provision for conferring
jurisdiction over them.6 Cases will undoubtedly arise where the host
country either cannot or will not prosecute,7 and it contravenes the
1 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court held in this case that a civilian dependent accompany-
ing the armed forces abroad and accused of a capital offense during peacetime could
not constitutionally be tried by a military court-martial.
2 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 861 U.S. 284 (1960), broadened Reid
by removing from court-martial jurisdiction those dependents accused of non-capital
offenses. Grisham v. Hagan, 861 U.S. 278 (1960), applied Reid to civilian employees accused
of capital offenses. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 861 U.S. 281 (1960),
extended Reid to employees accused of non-capital offenses.
3 The statute conferring court-martial jurisdiction over civilians before Reid is
art. 2(11) of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTicE (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964).
4 The Reid line of cases apparently does not affect the jurisdiction of a military
court-martial over civilians accompanying the armed services during a declared war or in
an area of hostilities. 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964). Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909),
states the general rule that the substitution of executive for judicial power is warranted
when the life of the state is threatened. Court-martial is probably applicable in an area
of hostilities even where there is no declared war. See Wiener, Courts-Martial for
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 (1968).
5 E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (Supp. 1968) (sabotage); 18 U.S.C. § 2881 (1964) (treason).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964) provides that jurisdiction over offenses committed outside
a district "shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first
brought." The term "offenses," however, has been defined as offenses against the United
States, and Congress has not placed crimes committed on foreign soil within this category.
See 20 Op. Arr'y GN. 590 (1893).
7 E.g., acts committed by one American civilian against another American on the
military base may not be of sufficient gravity to threaten the security or order of the
host country to warrant their prosecution. Certainly the United States might well desire
to prosecute for such offenses. Nor would it seem to be a valid argument that since
diplomatic officials are subject to sole jurisdiction of the host country, military employees
and dependents should also be subject to this jurisdiction. The number of diplomatic
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American sense of justice to permit these offenders to go "scot-free."
Under existing concepts of jurisdiction, both domestic and in-
ternational, Congress has the power to provide jurisdiction over United
States civilians accompanying the armed forces abroad. Congress has
the constitutional authority to create courts inferior to the Supreme
Court,9 determine their jurisdiction, 0 and determine the place of trial
in criminal cases where the offense is not committed within any state."
Operating within this broad discretionary power, Congress has regulated
the conduct of nationals overseas. Statutes have established United
States consular courts,12 given the federal courts power to subpoena
United States citizens living overseas as witnesses, 3 developed the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of federal courts,14 and pro-
vided for the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).15 Although
the Supreme Court has held courts-martial under the UCMJ violative
of a civilian's constitutional guarantees, 16 it has never questioned the
basic right of Congress to exercise extraterritorial 'jurisdiction within
the constitutional framework. 17
officials is a small fraction of the number of dependents. In addition they do not
live in a community regulated by Americans, as do the civilians on army bases. Since
they are selected officials, the number of crimes they commit is very small and well
within the ability of the host country to handle.
8 106 CoNG. REc. 726 (1960) (Remarks of Sen. Keating on the floor of the Senate on
the day following the Kinsella decision).
9 "The Congress shall have power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court .. " U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Id. art. III, § 1.
10 "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make." Id. art. III, § 2.
11 "[Blut when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." Id.
12 Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, § 2, REv. STAT. § 4084. These courts were established
by treaty arrangements with several countries where the United States had ministers
or consuls. The United States officials were empowered to arraign and try United
States citizens, to issue process, and to pronounce sentences. The consular court system
was abolished in 1956 when the consular court in Morocco was terminated. (Act of Aug.
1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964). "A court of the United States may order the issuance of a
subpoena as a witness before it ... a national or resident of the United States who is
in a foreign country . ..."
14 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964). See also note 32 infra.
15 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
16 In Reid, for example, the holding was not that Congress lacked the power to
provide jurisdiction, but that the vehicle used was inappropriate because it failed to
guarantee the trial by jury to those civilians brought before it.
17 In Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), for example, the Court upheld
the subpoena power of a United States court over an American citizen residing in Paris,
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ABROAD
The "nationality principle" of international law recognizes that
a sovereign has jurisdiction not only over conduct within its territory
but also over its nationals wherever located.' 8 The United States recog-
nizes the applicability of this principle to its affairs in general, 19 al-
though it has not traditionally exercised extraterritorial criminal juris-
diction.20
Treaties clarify the international law basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the United States. After World War II, the United
States, for the first time in peacetime, sent large numbers of American
troops and civilians to overseas bases. The United States' nationality-
based interest in having criminal jurisdiction over these persons con-
flicted with the host country's territorial basis of jurisdiction.21 When
such a conflict occurs in international law, the territorial sovereign has
sole enforcement jurisdiction unless it consents to another country's
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.22 Prior to Reid, consent was
obtained in Status of Forces agreements with host countries for court-
martial jurisdiction over civilians.23 Under these treaties, the host
country retained primary jurisdiction over United States citizens for
most offenses24 but permitted United States military authorities
secondary jurisdiction if the host country waived jurisdiction. 25 With
this consent from the host country to exercise secondary jurisdiction,
the United States began routinely to request host country waiver of
stating: "By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its
authority over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign
country." Id. at 436.
18 See, e.g., 2 J. MooRE, A DiGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 255-56 (1906).
19 ALl FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTE STATES § 16 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1958):
(I) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing the conduct of its na-
tionals wherever located.
(2) A state may not prescribe rules governing the conduct of aliens outside its
territory merely because such conduct affects nationals of the state outside
of its territory.
20 Id. § 31.
21 Id. § 11. "A state has jurisdiction to enforce in its territory rules of conduct which
are validly prescribed."
22 Id. § 83. See also Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19.
23 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 [hereinafter
cited as NATO Agreement]. Since the NATO Agreement covers more countries, has
served as the model for later treaties, and is more generally known, it alone will be
cited to illustrate issues raised in this note. Other important treaties include Military
Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, August 10, 1965, 16 U.S.T.
1040, T.IA.S. No. 5851; Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in
Japan, January 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.IA.S. No. 4510.
24 NATO Agreement, supra note 23, art. VII, 8(b).
25 Id. art. VII, 3(c).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
primary jurisdiction. And in over two-thirds of all cases, the host
country acquiesced. 26 Since Reid, however, there has not been a United
States court with secondary jurisdiction over civilians.27 Several
proposals have been suggested to restore this secondary criminal juris-
diction over civilians.
To solve the problem of criminal jurisdiction over civilians
abroad, we could return all dependents to the United States, 28 request
that civilians waive their constitutional rights as a condition for going
overseas with the armed forces, 29 or induct civilian employees into the
armed forces.30 None of these proposals is adequate. Two others, how-
ever, appear feasible at this time. Both require congressional action,
because only Congress has the power to vest secondary jurisdiction
in United States tribunals.
I
VEST CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER UNITED STATES CIVILIANS
ABROAD IN THE UNITED STATES DIsTRcT COURTS
A bill before the last Congress provided that existing United
States District Courts would exercise criminal jurisdiction over civil-
ian offenders abroad. Former H.R. 11244 would have amended section
7 of title 18 of the United States Code by providing another category
of persons for inclusion within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States:
(b) For the purposes of this title, any act done outside the United
States and its territories and possessions, within an area leased by
or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States
which is under the control of the Armed Forces of the United
States, shall be deemed to have been done within the special marl-
20 Baxter, Criminal Jurisdiction in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 7 INT.
& Comp'. L.Q. 72, 79-80 (1958).
27 Of course, military personnel remain liable to court-martial.
28 Since Congress and the military authorities have deemed it necessary for reasons
of morale to send dependents to overseas bases with military personnel, they will
probably not give serious attention to this proposal.
29 Bill of Rights guarantees are personal rights and as such can be waived by an
individual. Since such a proposal would amount to obvious coercion on the part of the
military authorities, the suggestion would not pass muster under the Reid rationale.
30 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 US. 281, 286 (1960). Mr. Justice
Clark mentioned this as a possibility and listed supporting precedents, but such a sug-
gestion would probably not be acceptable to the military. If they thought that their
purposes could be better achieved by such a suggestion, they surely would have acted
already to induct civilians into the armed forces. Furthermore, this does not solve the
difficulty with respect to dependents.
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time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States if the act was
done by any national of the United States employed by or accom-
panying the Armed Forces of the United States who is not a mem-
ber of such Armed Forces .... 31
As introduced, this bill would have partially filled the jurisdictional
void. Only the few acts punishable in the special maritime jurisdic-
tion82 would be covered where the host country fails to prosecute for an
act committed on the military base. The bill would have required no
new substantive law, since the prohibited acts are already defined. In
addition, existing United States tribunals would have tried the cases.
Despite these provisions, such a proposal raises serious problems.
Undoubtedly, securing witnesses residing abroad is the greatest diffi-
culty with criminal prosecution in United States District Courts.
Compelling both American and foreign nationals to appear before
United States courts will be difficult. The power of United States
courts to issue subpoenas compelling citizens to return to the United
States as witnesses88 is not supported by an effective sanction.84 A for-
eign court with territorial jurisdiction must order the witness to return
to the United States in response to a letter rogatory, and such power
may not exist in the foreign tribunal.35
Compelling members of the United States armed forces to testify
in the United States may raise problems, especially if their skills are
critically needed at the base. For civil proceedings, overseas military
personnel normally need not testify. The power to grant permission is
discretionary and is given only under "extraordinary circumstances." 36
For criminal trials in the United States, military personnel presumably
could leave the base after completion of advance arrangements with
the proper authorities.
31 H.R. 11244, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
32 The crimes included in the special maritime jurisdiction are found in 18 U.S.C.
(1964). They include arson, § 81; assault, § 113; carnal knowledge of female under
16, § 2032; espionage, §§ 791-97; larceny, §§ 661-62; maiming, § 114; malicious mischief,
buildings or property, § 1363; rape, § 2031; robbery and burglary, §§ 2111-17.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
34 The sanction available to a United States court should a witness fail to respond
to the subpoena is contempt of court accompanied by a fine. 28 U.S.C. § 1784 (1964).
The fine is enforceable only in rem against the party's property in the United States.
5 In the reverse situation, United States courts are not authorized to compel
foreign nationals in the United States to return to their country and appear as witnesses
under a letter rogatory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964) for powers of United States courts
to respond to a letter rogatory from a foreign tribunal.
36 "Permission to appear in such cases [where a 'witness stationed outside the
continental United States is requested to appear before a tribunal within the continental
United States] will be granted only under the most extraordinary circumstances." 82
C.F.R. § 516.4(d)(3) (1968).
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If a foreign witness does not volunteer to testify in United States
courts, he cannot be compelled to do so under the United States sub-
poena power.37 And unless there is assistance from the country that has
jurisdiction, United States courts may not act.38 The use of depositions,
however, will not be an adequate alternative; in criminal proceedings
depositions are likely to violate the defendant's right of confrontation. 9
Also, the expense and planning required by intercontinental
transportation of the defendant, the witnesses, and the evidence may be
prohibitive. The defendant must pay for the transportation and lodging
of his witnesses, 40 and his lawyer will probably be required to travel
abroad to investigate the case, locate witnesses, and compile evidence.41
Unless the defendant is indigent, 42 the excessive costs may preclude an
adequate defense.
Procedural problems, however, are not the only drawbacks in
former H.R. 11244. Before Reid, both civilians and military men were
governed by the same substantive criminal code. Under the bill, how-
ever, a serviceman accused of homicide would be tried for murder
under the UCMJ43 while a civilian who committed the same act in the
same place would be tried for assault with intent to murder under the
special maritime jurisdiction.44 Although the necessity for discipline
37 The United States has neither of the traditional bases of jurisdiction (territory
or nationality) over a foreign national and cannot, therefore, compel his attendance in
the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D. Mass. 1948):
"Aliens who are inhabitants of a foreign country cannot be compelled to respond to a
subpoena. They owe no allegiance to the United States."
38 United States courts have the power to issue letters rogatory requesting that a
sovereign court compel a foreign witness to produce a document or to give a deposition.
28 U.S.C. § 1781(b)(2) (1964). Similarly, foreign tribunals have the power to compel their
own citizens to produce information requested by another country's courts. See, e.g., The
Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, § 24; The Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act
of 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 113, § 1.
39 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . See also Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895): "The primary object of the constitutional
provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness ...... Because these rights are for the benefit of the accused, the defendant
may use depositions of overseas witnesses for trial in the United States, even though
they may not be used against him.
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964).
41 Attorneys occasionally travel abroad in domestic cases, but almost every trial
under H.R. 11244 would require international travel.
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
43 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1964).
44 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1964). The maximum penalty for this offense is 20 years
imprisonment, while the penalty for murder under the UCMJ is death or life im-
prisonment. 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1964).
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often justifies harsher treatment for military personnel, this great
disparity of treatment for essentially the same offense is unreasonable.
Further, Status of Forces agreements do not distinguish between
acts committed on and off the military base. In each case the host
country's jurisdiction is primary, and that of the United States authori-
ties secondary. Although H.R. 11244 was intended to fill the jurisdic-
tional void created by Reid, it failed to provide jurisdiction for acts
committed off base. Cases might arise from off-base acts of United
States civilians that the host country does not desire to prosecute but
that the United States should handle.
Recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of criminal procedure
raise the additional problem of guaranteeing constitutional protections
to a defendant in the custody of the host country or United States
military authorities. If a suspect is first detained by foreign authorities,
what rights will he have? Must he receive the four-fold Miranda
warning?45 Will there be lawyers on the military bases in the event that
a suspect requests one?
Also, there are no procedures for arrest and pre-trial removal of
civilians from the host country. The arrest procedure for civilians under
the Status of Forces agreements requires both countries to "assist" each
other.46 This cooperation has existed only within the framework of
court-martial jurisdiction in the host country's territory. A foreign
state might view a trial in the United States differently, and not agree
to arrest civilian offenders in its territory.
More doubtful is whether the United States has the power to re-
move a United States civilian from a foreign country for trial in the
United States. Present extradition treaties with foreign states do not
appear to apply in this type of case. The premise in extradition pro-
ceedings is that a crime was committed within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the requesting country, that the accused moved or fled to the
requested country, and that the return of the accused is for the purpose
of having trial in the jurisdiction where the alleged act was committed.4 7
Similarly, Status of Forces agreements apparently do not require a host
45 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46 NATO Agreement, supra note 23, art. VII, 5(a).
47 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty--Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122 (1932),
T.S. No. 849 (effective Aug. 9, 1932); Extradition Treaty-Germany, July 12, 1930, 47
Stat. 1862 (1931), T.S. No. 836 (effective Apr. 22, 1931); Extradition Treaty-France, Jan.
6, 1909, 37 Stat. 1526, T.S. No. 561 (effective July 26, 1911).
Arguably a crime committed on an American military base is within the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States. But this argument is inconsistent with international
law which bases territorial jurisdiction on sovereignty. ALI FORGN REAMONS LAw oF
a UNrrao STAT=s, § 8, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958).
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country to permit the removal of a United States civilian.48 In the
absence of new agreements or voluntary permission in each case, re-
moval of a United States civilian to the United States for trial might be
impossible.
Most of these difficulties can be corrected either by congressional
action or by treaty with the host country. The expenses involved in
transporting persons and evidence to the United States can be met by
a statute based theoretically on the in forma pauperis proceedings now
applicable in federal courts. 49 How much of the cost should be paid
by the government is a policy question lying within congressional dis-
cretion.50
Provisions for arrest of a United States civilian abroad could be
made in the same bill that would grant jurisdiction to the district
courts. Since military authorities are closest to an offender, they could
be granted this arrest power. The State Department might also consider
formal arrangements with the host countries to permit their arrest or
detention of suspected offenders, under a plan similar to the Status of
Forces agreements. 51 The procedures for obtaining a warrant or an
indictment against an offender will also require some action by Con-
gress. 52
To return offenders to the United States for trial, formal treaty
arrangements should be made with the several host countries where
we have military bases. Amending the current extradition treaties would
48 The host country may indirectly assist in the removal by requesting the removal
or ordering the expulsion of an alien civilian on its territory. NATO Agreement, supra
note 23, art. III, (5). In addition, if the trial is held on the military base, the host country
may give "sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the sending
State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the
authorities of the sending State ... Id. art. VII, (7)(b).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
50 For example, should the lawyer's fee be included, and if so, should the govern-
ment pay for his transportation abroad to investigate and question witnesses? How many
defense witnesses will the government support? Should Congress delegate this discretion
to the trial judge for an analysis of the needs of each case? In addition to congressional
plans, constitutional requirements may also arise in light of Supreme Court decisions
regarding the rights of indigents. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (lawyer);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript).
51 NATO Agreement, supra note 23, art. VII, (5)(a).
52 If an indictment is not necessary to procure a warrant, issuance by a military
official rather than by a commissioner in the United States would be effective and less
time consuming. See F.D. R. CGRIM. P. 4(a). The designated official would have better
access to facts, and he would be in a better position to ascertain the requirements of
probable cause. Congress must decide whether the grand jury should be convened in the
United States or overseas. From the viewpoint of witnesses and evidence, the latter would
be preferable.
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be the most expeditious manner to achieve this. The host country should
not object to this idea because only cases in which the host country
had waived its primary jurisdiction would be involved.5 3
Since this proposal is designed primarily to reach civilians ex-
cluded from court-martial jurisdiction, Congress might also consider
extending jurisdiction to include off-base crimes covered by pre-Reid
Status of Forces agreements. Limiting jurisdiction to acts committed
on the base might make prosecution a little tidier, since the witness
problem would not be so severe.54 Assuring constitutional guarantees
to the defendant might also be easier if apprehension took place on the
base. However, two countervailing arguments appear in favor of ex-
tending jurisdiction to off-base crimes. First, the host country may
appreciate the United States removing bothersome cases involving only
Americans from its calendars. Second, in some cases the United States
would have a special interest in prosecuting an offender. 55
Prior to Reid, the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles"O held that ex-servicemen could not be prosecuted by court-
martial for offenses committed while in the armed services overseas.
Since this decision created a similar jurisdictional gap concerning
American citizens, Congress should consider placing this group within
a statute.57
Congress might also reconsider the wisdom of limiting the juris-
diction over civilians to those acts defined in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction. The special maritime jurisdiction has the
advantage of being existing substantive law. In addition, the enumer-
ated crimes are relatively major, allowing the prosecution to con-
centrate on only the greater offenses. However, because of those cir-
cumstances where the special maritime jurisdiction is inadequate,58
53 Although "political crimes" and other activities designated by the host country
might be exempted from the removal process, see, e.g., Extradition Treaty-Great Britain,
Dec. 22, 1931, art. 6, 47 Stat. 2122 (1932), T.S. No. 849 (effective Aug. 9, 1932), the host
country would probably agree to removal for most offenses since its interest would also
be served in having criminal offenders removed from its territory.
54 Witnesses would less likely be foreign nationals not amenable to process.
55 For instance, a civilian employee or dependent might assault a United States
serviceman off-base. This act may not sufficiently affect the host country to warrant
prosecution, but the United States has an interest in prosecuting.
56 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
57 The Supreme Court in Quarles suggested that Congress take this step by stating,
"'There can be no valid argument, therefore, that civilian ex-servicemen must be tried
by court-martial or not tried at all. If that is so it is only because Congress has not seen
fit to subject them to trial in federal district courts." United States ex rel. Toth v.
,Quarles, 350 US. 11, 21 (1955).
58 Note 32 supra.
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Congress should either increase the list of crimes in the maritime
jurisdiction or use a more comprehensive substantive law.59
Finally, as indicated in Reid, constitutional guarantees follow the
United States citizen overseas. The plan's administrators will thus be
forced to establish due process safeguards for the early stages of deten-
tion. If United States authorities are involved with the arrest, the
Miranda warnings must be given, and defendant must be furnished
with legal counsel if requested. But what if foreign authorities arrest
the offender? Arguably the exclusionary rules would apply in an ap-
propriate situation.60 This difficulty might be partially alleviated if
the United States and the host country could agree to a speedy transfer
of an offender to United States authorities as soon as the host country
decided to waive its primary jurisdiction.
Thus, many of the flaws in former H.R. 11244 could be eliminated
by statute or treaty. Unfortunately, this technique has little value in
the area of obtaining witnesses to testify in the United States District
Court. Because the availability of witnesses is crucial, and because some
other difficulties may not be resolved, an alternative proposal should be
formulated.
II
VEST CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN AN OVERSEAS CIVILIAN COURT
Many of the difficulties raised by placing criminal jurisdiction in
United States District Courts could be resolved by having a civilian
judge hear cases against civilian dependents and employees at the
overseas bases. At first impression, the idea of a globe-trotting judge
may seem fanciful, but United States judges have traditionally ridden
judicial circuits.
Overseas courts would possess certain advantages not present when
trials are held in the United States.61 Their primary advantage is the
59 An appropriate model might be the provisions of the Canal Zone Code. See 6
C.Z.C. §§ 1-2601 (1963).
60 The Supreme Court has apparently never directly discussed the "silver platter"
doctrine as it relates to evidence obtained by foreign officers and used in United States
courts. In Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967),
the court of appeals admitted such evidence. For a critique of this case, see Note,
Searches South of the Border: Admission of Evidence Seized by Foreign Officials, 53
CORNELL L. R.Ev. 886 (1968).
61 Where the offender, as in Toth v. Quarles, is located in the United States at the
time of trial, Congress should provide concurrent jurisdiction in continental United
States District Courts.
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ease of obtaining witnesses. Certainly a larger number of persons,
including foreign witnesses, would be more likely to volunteer to
testify at a nearby court. Absent the cost and inconvenience of trans-
porting witnesses to the United States, both the prosecution and the
defense would be aided. In addition, servicemen called as witnesses
would be more accessible if military emergencies demanded their
services.6 2
Compelling foreign nationals to testify at the trial under existing
provisions is doubtful. Under the Status of Forces agreements, if a
United States citizen is tried in a foreign tribunal, he has the right
of compulsory process "for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they
are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State." 63 By a similar treaty
arrangement permitting compulsory process by the United States
civilian court, or by letters rogatory to a foreign tribunal, the problem
of compelling foreign witnesses to testify could be solved. The host
country would probably be more willing to aid in providing com-
pulsory process if the trial took place on the military base rather than
in the continental United States.64
One of the most compelling reasons for having an overseas court
is that the size of the civilian population and the magnitude of the
criminal problem do not readily lend themselves to being engrafted
on the jurisdiction of district courts in the stop-gap fashion of H.R.
11244. The figures cited in the government's brief in the Guagliardo
case indicated an overseas civilian population in 1959 in excess of
480,000. 5 This figure is larger than the respective populations of
Alaska, Wyoming and Vermont.66 Indeed, many of our foreign military
62 While some servicemen might be either transferred or discharged, their number
would be small in comparison to those unavailable under the alternative plan.
63 NATO Agreement, supra note 23, art. VII, 9(d).
64 A treaty between the host country and the United States for securing witnesses
could be patterned after the UNIFORM Acr To SEcuRE THE ATrENDENCE OF WITNgs
FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS §§ 2-3. This act is in operation among
many of the states in the United States and provides that the requesting state submit a
petition to the state where the desired witness is located. Subsequently, a court from the
sending state will summon the witness to appear before it. The sending state has the
discretion to determine whether or not to compel its resident to appear before a
tribunal in another state. Such factors as the witness's materiality and convenience are
considered before an order is made.
65 As of March 31, 1959, there were 25,585 civilian employees and 455,086- dependents
accompanying the armed forces overseas. Brief for Petitioners at 71, McElroy v. United
States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Guagliardo Brief]. By
1960 this population had grown to 35,825 and 505,752 respectively. US. BuREAu OF THE
CFNSus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1968).
66 Alaska-272,000; Wyoming-S15,000; Vermont-417,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, supra note 65, at 12.
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bases contain a civilian population commensurate with that of many
American towns. In one four-year period before Reid, these civilians
committed 5,026 offenses, 4,051 of which were handled by United
States military authorities after the host countries waived jurisdiction.67
Many required a criminal trial.
Another advantage of having an overseas trial would be the
inclusion of lesser crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, e.g.,
drunken or reckless driving. At present only foreign tribunals can
prosecute such a case even if the offense occurs on a military base.
Foreign courts are probably not interested in clogging their calendars
with such cases. Nor is Congress likely to include such an offense within
the jurisdiction of courts in the United States, since it is too bother-
some to prosecute a minor offense thousands of miles from its locus.
An overseas trial, however, makes prosecution feasible.
The difficulties in arresting and removing an offender to the
United States would be no greater than under the alternative scheme.
If anything, removal would be easier because a host country would
probably be more willing to permit removal of a convicted offender.
Procedures could be modelled after the Status of Forces agreements,
where, after trial, an offender is sent to the United States for imprison-
ment.68
The existence of persons on foreign bases sufficient to compose
67 Guagliardo Brief, supra note 65, at 75. The four-year period was from December
1, 1954 to November 30, 1958. The offenses committed break down as follows:
Type of Offense Employees Dependents
Murder 1 2
Rape 8 1
Manslaughter 32 16
Arson 0 6
Robbery, larceny and related offenses 7 36
Aggravated assault 8 8
Simple assault 50 21
Offenses against economic control laws 231 54
Traffic offenses including
drunken and reckless driving
and fleeing scene of accident 2,566 1,791
Disorderly conduct, drunkeness,
breach of peace, etc. 28 41
Other 36 88
Totals 2,962 2,064
68 NATO Agreement, supra note 23, at art. VII, 7(b). Normally, civilians con-
victed by court-martial procedure under the Status of Forces agreements were sent to
United States prisons rather than being punished in the host countries. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 4 (1957). Presumably the same arrangements could be continued under
civilian trial procedures.
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ABROAD
an impartial jury is essential to this proposal. On the larger military
bases in Europe, there should be no difficulty finding a jury.69 Further-
more, in the NATO countries and in others where United States
businessmen and other United States civilians reside, the overseas
court would probably have jurisdiction to require jury duty.1 0
On smaller bases, where the number of United States civilians
available for jury duty is small, Congress might consider empaneling
members of the armed forces. At present they are exempted,71 although
not excluded,72 from jury service. Legislative history indicates that
members of the armed forces would be able to serve in these circum-
stances. 73 And except for pilots and other persons with critical skills,
the military authorities should not object to having servicemen sit on
juries. The alternatives-no trial at all or trial in the United States
(which might necessitate calling military witnesses)-seem less ac-
ceptable.
One further objection to this proposal is that a foreign sovereign
would not permit a United States civilian court to hear cases on its
territory; its national pride would be injured.74 If a country's national
pride survives a full-fledged military enclave of a foreign power on its
soil, some additional civilian judges should not make much difference.75
In addition, the foreign country would still retain primary jurisdiction
over United States civilians. In cases where the host country would
69 The dvilian population in some of the NATO countries is quite large. E.g.,
Germany 186,008; Great Britain 39,548. Guagliardo Brief, supra note 65, at 110-11.
70 See notes 17-19 supra. Normally these persons are excused from jury duty because
of hardship or inconvenience. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1964). However, overseas trials would
render these reasons less compelling.
One constitutional problem is whether these persons would be within the judicial
district required by the constitution: "[which district shall have been previously as-
certained by law ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend VI. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1964). But since
Congress has the power to determine the districts, it could include these civilians within
the district for the purposes of jury duty.
71 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1964).
72 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, -63 (1964).
73 Members of the armed forces apparently were exempted from jury duty in federal
trials solely because they were being excused en mass from serving in the interest of the
public welfare. Reviser's note, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1964). There seems to be no other ob-
jection to having servicemen sit on juries since other government employees are permitted
to do so. United States v. Knowles, 147 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1957).
74 Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying American Armed Forces
Overseas, 71 HARv. L. REv. 712, 725 (1957).
75 However, there may be some undesirable effects when the United States tries to
obtain the consent of the host countries for an overseas civilian court. For example, these
countries may ask that the Status of Forces agreements be renegotiated in some of their
aspects, and the United States may balk at such a proposal.
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prefer not to prosecute, the United States court would actually be
doing it a service.
There are three possible approaches to setting up an overseas
court. A separate judicial district could be created with a new United
States District Court hearing these cases. Under this approach, the
entire overseas civilian population would be treated as a separate state
for criminal jurisdiction purposes. Should Congress determine that
there are not a sufficient number of cases to justify a separate judicial
district, the military bases could be divided up among the existing
judicial districts. The manner in which the districts would be enlarged
to handle these cases depends on several policy factors such as geo-
graphical location, amount of judicial work in each district, and the
availability of judges to travel to the overseas bases.
An alternative approach would be to create a separate and inde-
pendent legislative court, the nature and scope of which could be deter-
mined by Congress under its article I powers.7 6 There is ample prece-
dent for such a court 77 and it may have the advantage of being more
acceptable to host countries. Instead of involving the entire United
States judicial apparatus, it would be separately created for the sole
purpose of disciplining and maintaining order among civilians ac-
companying the United States armed forces.
Robert W. Wild
76 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. The power to create legislative courts can be found in any
one of the enumerated powers taken together with the necessary and proper clause.
77 United States consular courts, 22 U.S.C. § 142 (1964); Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441
(1964); United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, 3 C.Z.C. § 1
(1963). Despite its name, the Canal Zone District Court is a legislative court and not an
art. III court. Wells v. United States, 214 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855
(1954). The district and magistrate's courts do not share jurisdiction with state courts
and must have full power to deal with litigation in the Canal Zone, as determined by
Congress.
